CREATIVE SYNTHESIS: EXPLORING THE PROCESS OF EXTRAORDINARY GROUP CREATIVITY
The article "Creative Synthesis: Exploring the Process of Extraordinary Group Creativity" by Sarah Harvey proposes a dialectical model for achieving breakthrough ideas in groups. The model focuses on creative synthesis, which is the integration of group members' perspectives into a unique shared understanding. The article challenges the assumption that random variation is the most effective way to achieve breakthrough ideas and instead suggests that conflict and tension are necessary for creativity.
In the context of architecture and the relationship between architects and structural engineers, this article suggests that diverse perspectives and conflict resolution are essential for producing breakthrough ideas. By embracing the dialectical model of creative synthesis, architects and structural engineers can work together to develop a unique shared understanding that can lead to extraordinary output. In order to apply the principles of creative synthesis to the design process in architecture, architects and structural engineers should engage in open communication and actively seek out diverse perspectives. This can involve conducting workshops or brainstorming sessions where each member is encouraged to share their ideas and perspectives. By doing so, the group can identify areas of conflict or tension and work to resolve them through discussion and negotiation.
It is also important for architects and structural engineers to recognize that there may be inherent tensions between their respective disciplines. For example, architects may prioritize aesthetics while structural engineers may prioritize functionality and safety. By acknowledging these tensions and working together to find a balance between them, the group can develop a more holistic and innovative design.
Ultimately, the principles of creative synthesis can guide architects and structural engineers in their collaboration by encouraging them to embrace diverse perspectives, engage in open communication, and work through conflict to achieve breakthrough ideas. By doing so, the group can develop a unique shared understanding that results in extraordinary output.
These callouts are my notes on this superb article.
What I find fascinating about this article is the fact that we, the design team working together on a building, have the essential ingredients required to produce a breakthrough idea, event or building. Strangely we appear to actively avoid it. We never get the right actors in the at the right time to trigger this event. Come with me through this journey.
SARAH HARVEY University College London
This article provides insight into how some groups achieve extraordinary levels of creativity by reconsidering the collective process through which new ideas develop. Previous research has been premised on a model in which idea generation stimulated by divergent input increases the variance in ideas a group generates and therefore increases the chance that one of the group’s ideas will be a radical, breakthrough creative product. In contrast, I present a dialectical model in which the integration of group members’ perspectives (which I label creative synthesis) is the foundation for new ideas. I propose that the process of creative synthesis improves the chance that each of a group’s ideas is a breakthrough. I elaborate the process facilitators of creative synthesis and the implications of the dialectical model for understanding extraordinary group creativity. Creative synthesis provides an alternative way for groups to combine their cognitive, social, and environmental resources into extraordinary output.
I am thankful for associate editor Neal Ashkanasy’s valuable guidance and the constructive feedback of three anonymous reviewers throughout the review process. In addition, I thank participants in the Strategy and Organizations reading group in the Department of Management Science and Innovation at UCL for their insightful comments on the manuscript.
Groups of people working together sometimes exhibit extraordinary group creativity—they consistently produce novel and useful products, processes, and other outputs that depart significantly from what has been done in the past (i.e., radical, breakthrough outputs). For example, interdisciplinary teams of writers, directors, storyboarders, and artists at the animation studio Pixar have repeatedly produced films enjoying an unprecedented degree of critical and commercial success (The Economist, 2010; The Hollywood Reporter, 2012). As Pixar president Ed Catmull summarized, “When it comes to producing breakthroughs . . . Pixar’s record is unique” (Catmull, 2008: 3). This kind of consistently outstanding performance has been described as extraordinary in other domains (Cotton, Shen, & Livne-Tarandach, 2011; Ericscson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993; Roberts, Dutton, Spreitzer, Heaphy, & Quinn, 2005); similarly, groups who consistently produce breakthrough creative ideas may be considered to exhibit extraordinary group creativity.
How do some groups achieve such extraordinary levels of creativity? Group creativity occurs when a bounded and recognizable collection of individuals works interdependently toward a shared goal (Hackman, 1987) of developing output that is both novel and useful (Amabile, 1988; Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993). Creative outputs can range from incremental improvements to radical ideas for breakthrough new products, services, or processes (George, 2007; Madjar, Greenberg, & Chen, 2011; Singh & Fleming, 2010). Research on group creativity has generally drawn on an evolutionary model in which random variation underlies the production of a range of creative outputs, resulting in ideas that fall along the continuum from incremental to breakthrough (Staw, 2009). A breakthrough idea falls into the right-hand tail of the distribution of a group’s ideas. Researchers have theorized that the chance of a breakthrough improves when a greater variety of resources enters the process, because diverse inputs stimulate variety in output.
Diversity is key. Producing random variation. But simple random variation is not enough to produce breakthrough ideas. Because someone (individual) still needs to develop these random ideas.
Although random variation has been a productive model for group creativity research, it seems ill-suited for providing a complete explanation of the consistent pattern of breakthroughs exhibited by groups like the production teams at Pixar because it treats breakthroughs as exceptions. We may instead consider whether a process exists that increases the chance that each group output is a breakthrough. Searching for alternative processes to explain extraordinary group creativity may be fruitful for two reasons. First, different forms of creative output are likely to be produced through different processes (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Madjar et al., 2011; Unsworth, 2001; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). At the group level, however, those alternatives have not been elaborated. Second, the random variation model is based on the processes of individual creators (Drazin, Glynn, & Kazanjian, 1999; Jackson & Poole, 2003). However, collective creativity differs from individual creativity (Hargadon & Bechky, 2006; Kurtzberg & Amabile, 2000-2001). Despite increasing attention to the group processes that support or hinder creativity (Shalley, 2008), the nature of the collective creative process itself remains underexplored.
Group creativity is unexplored.
The purpose of this article is to develop an alternative process through which groups may combine the cognitive, social, and environmental resources identified as supporting group creativity in previous research to achieve extraordinary levels of creativity. The process draws on a dialectical model and is summarized in Figure 1. Specifically, I suggest that combining resources through a process of creative synthesis can increase the chance that a given idea is a breakthrough. Creative synthesis is an integration of group members’ perspectives into a shared understanding that is unique to the collective. The synthesis acts like a map that guides the development of ideas that are exemplars of the synthesis. The exemplars also prompt groups to change or refine the synthesis so that synthesis and exemplars coevolve. Synthesis develops through a process in which groups focus their collective attention, enact ideas, and build on similarities within their diverse perspectives. I propose that this process is more likely to result in a breakthrough idea. Figure 2 illustrates that the resulting creative product and the synthesis form the starting point for a new process of creative synthesis. Over time, repeating the process is expected to facilitate the consistent production of breakthrough ideas, enabling groups to achieve extraordinary levels of creativity.
The dialectic approach to group creativity builds on previous research in three ways. First, the model extends our understanding of group creativity to incorporate the repeated production of breakthrough ideas over time, rather than isolated moments of creative breakthrough. Second, the model integrates insights from individual and organizational research to highlight that the process through which a group’s resources are transformed can influence the nature and magnitude of creative output. It therefore expands the scope of research from the resources that support group creativity to alternative processes for using those resources. Third, the model offers process-based facilitators of extraordinary group creativity that have been relatively underexplored in the literature to date by emphasizing the importance of developing a unique synthesis of perspectives. While this insight is appreciated in the creativity literature generally, it has not yet been well integrated into our understanding of the group creative process. The facilitators draw on the cognitive, social, and environmental resources identified as supporting creativity in previous research, but they constitute new ways for groups to use those resources. In sum, the facilitators indicate that a group’s diverse resources are most effective for extraordinary group creativity when they are applied to developing a synthesized understanding of the problem or task, rather than to promoting divergence between group members.
The way I view this is that continuous and repeated breakthroughs occur between domains, not outside of them. The groups knowledge is transformed through a process to develop a unique perspective to the group.
ACHIEVING BREAKTHROUGHS THROUGH RANDOM VARIATION
A well-established body of research on idea generation and brainstorming in laboratory and organizational settings provides insight into the resources that increase a group’s chance of producing a breakthrough creative idea (e.g., Amabile, 1988; Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006; Paulus & Yang, 2000; West, 2002). In particular, breakthrough ideas are more likely when groups draw on a variety of resources. For example, groups tend to be more creative when they fully access members’ cognitive resources (e.g., Gallupe, Bastianutti, & Cooper, 1991; Shin, Kim, Lee, & Bian, 2012), have diverse social resources based on group composition and interaction (e.g., Muira & Hida, 2004; Watson, Kumar, & Michaelson, 1993), and are supported by environmental resources that motivate members to generate and share ideas (Eisenbeiss, van Knippenberg, & Boerner, 2008; Taggar, 2002; Tsai, Chi, Grandey, & Fung, 2012). Similarly, groups can decrease their chance of selecting a poor idea from the left-hand side of the distribution (Singh & Fleming, 2010) by using their individual cognitive resources or combined social resources to select creative ideas (e.g., Goncalo & Staw, 2006; Miron-Spektor, Erez, & Naveh, 2011).
Interesting - supportive environment (psychologically safe), diverse resources and access to these resources.
An evolutionary model of idea generation through random variation followed by selective retention (Campbell, 1960; Simonton, 1999; Staw, 1990) is the creative process underpinning research in this vein. Three features characterize the creative process in the model, and each feature has facilitated group creativity research. First, the process is staged. To begin, a problem is identified or presented and ideas are generated in response. Ideas are then compared against evaluation criteria, and one or more ideas are selected to implement. Although researchers have recognized that the stages are likely to be recursive and iterative (Lubart, 2001) and that they constitute the first phase of a broader innovation process (Hülsheger, Anderson, & Salgado, 2009; West, 2002; Woodman et al., 1993), the sequence follows a natural pattern that has rarely been questioned (Fryer, 2012). This characteristic allows researchers to isolate and examine stages of the process independently (e.g., Coskun, Paulus, Brown, & Sherwood, 2000; Rietzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2006). The second feature of the process is that idea generation occurs through divergent thinking, in which one group member’s ideas stimulate new directions for others’ creative thinking. This feature has enabled researchers to identify ways to facilitate the critical idea generation stage of the process (e.g., Paulus & Yang, 2000). The third feature is that the process is adaptive and goal directed. This feature has allowed researchers to explore the conditions under which groups are most likely to achieve the idealized creative process (e.g., Eisenbeiss et al., 2008; Taggar, 2002; West, 2002).
But Sarah is saying this is not the right way. It might create one idea. But we want repeated breakthrough ideas.
RECONSIDERING THE RANDOM VARIATION PROCESS FOR EXTRAORDINARY GROUP CREATIVITY
The theorized process has been productive for elaborating resources that support extraordinary group creativity, but it also has limitations. Alvesson and Sandberg (2011) suggest two bases on which to challenge the assumptions embedded in existing research that are relevant to the literature on group creativity. First, evaluating the assumptions of the evolutionary model underlying the literature reveals that the model is better suited to explaining the generation of a single breakthrough idea than to explaining consistent breakthroughs. Although some evolutionary models can explain radical, breakthrough creativity, they generally assume incremental change driven by factors outside of the group (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995) and view radical changes as infrequent (Gersick, 1991). Further, it is not clear to what extent blind variation, which is central to the evolutionary model, is possible or desirable (Runco, 2003). For example, several authors argue that idea development is guided by expertise (Weisberg & Hass, 2007) and affect (Russ, 1999) and is therefore better described as “sighted variation” (Sternberg, 1998).
Second, the empirical evidence in support of both the value of a group’s cognitive, social, and environmental resources and the group creative process itself is equivocal. In some cases the resources predicted to improve group creativity fail to do so, or the relationship contradicts the model’s predictions. For example, interaction is necessary to provide access to other members’ cognitive resources, but it is challenging for group members and depletes their own cognitive resources for idea generation (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987); diverse composition is expected to provide more varied input, but diverse groups sometimes underperform homogeneous groups on creative tasks (Harvey, 2013); and a supportive environment is expected to enhance creativity, but constrained task environments sometimes also promote creativity (Hoegl, Gibbert, & Mazursky, 2008). Moreover, studies of the collaborative process in creatively demanding contexts like music, art, and science reveal that creative groups often do not follow the expected process (e.g., Elsbach & Kramer, 2003; Hargadon & Bechky, 2006; Long-Lingo & O’Mahony, 2010; Weick, 1998). Instead of generating ideas and then selecting from the resulting idea set, group members often focus on single ideas in depth, ignore ideas, criticize ideas as they arise, and provide immediate interpersonal rewards for good ideas. Those studies, however, tend to be conducted outside of research on idea generation and brainstorming (George, 2007).
wow. This throws out the entire notion on how to generate ideas.
These factors combine to suggest that teams like those at Pixar may draw on their resources through a different process. Supporting this suggestion, studies of creative collaborations reveal that creativity occurs through a dialectic negotiation and integration of stakeholders’ opinions and perspectives (Hargadon & Bechky, 2006; Long-Lingo & O’Mahony, 2010; Murnighan & Conlon, 1991; Sawyer, 2004). A similar process of reorganizing and integrating divergent understandings has been elaborated for individual (e.g., Koestler, 1964) and organizational (e.g., Drazin et al., 1999; Hargadon, 2002) creativity.
For example, although Pixar exemplifies some features of traditional advice for creative organizations, elements of the process through which teams develop films at Pixar are unusual. The critical creative moment at Pixar comes not when group members diverge but when they synthesize diverse ideas. In particular, the integration of art and technology underlies Pixar films. Attempts to synthesize art and technology create tension, but the resolution of that tension produces novelty (Catmull, 2008). For instance, the idea for A Bug’s Life created the challenge of rendering the insect world in a way that would make audiences warm to an otherwise unappealing character; technology rose to that challenge by making the film visually stunning (Isaacson, 2011). Fusing art and technology has enabled Pixar to transform animated film by finding technology-based solutions to artistic problems that “songs and love stories” traditionally solved in that genre (Pixar writer and director Andrew Stanton; cited in Friend, 2011). Teams at Pixar begin with a shared understanding of character, narrative, music, and technology (Anderson, 2011). They then create a small amount of animation each day as the starting point for the following day’s work. That animation highlights problems to be solved so that “Pixar’s films will suck virtually until the last stage of production—problems are constantly identified and fixed” (Sims, 2011). Despite the unique aspects of Pixar’s process, the company expects and allows its approach to develop over time. Early on, Pixar replaced songs and love stories with “big stars saying witty dialogue” (Andrew Stanton; quoted in Friend, 2011). It then created Wall-E, a film with virtually no dialogue (Friend, 2011), upending the very practices that had made the company successful in the past.
The process that teams follow at Pixar provides insight into an alternative way groups may produce and reproduce breakthrough ideas. In the following sections I describe that as a process of creative synthesis and explore how it explains extraordinary group creativity.
A DIALECTICAL MODEL OF EXTRAORDINARY GROUP CREATIVITY
Creative synthesis is rooted in a dialectical model in which the constant struggle between conflicting forces is a driver of change and novelty (Hegel, 1977; Marx, 1967). Hegel in particular conceptualized the integration of dialectic forces as the heart of this process (see also Ford & Ford, 1994). According to the model, people engage in social interactions that are determined by their understanding of a situation (Bartunek, 1984; Berger & Luckmann, 1966). That understanding influences ways of thinking, the questions that are asked, and the rules for what is acceptable and desirable (Brown, 1978). Because interpretations of situations and the actions that flow from them contain incompatibilities, inconsistencies between competing views create the opportunity for novelty to emerge (Benson, 1977; Seo & Creed, 2002). That opportunity is realized when understandings are reconciled in a creative synthesis (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989).
Conflict and tension are necessary for creativity.
Also, this feeds into my philosophy about co-creation. Being compliant, and therefore not generating tension doesn’t produce anything novel.
Conflict is a core element of a dialectical model, just as it is central to the evolutionary model underlying random variation. The role of conflict differs between the two models, however. Whereas in random variation conflict sparks dissent and disagreement, stimulating idea generation through divergent thinking (Jehn, 1995; Nemeth, 1986), in creative synthesis conflict provides opportunities for diverse views to be integrated. Opposing views move toward one another in creative synthesis, rather than away from one another. In addition, the source of conflict differs between the two models. Whereas conflict originates in the perspectives that members bring to the group in random variation, in a dialectical model conflict arises through the continuing social interactions between group members and their environment (Kolb & Putnam, 1992). Conflict is therefore perpetual in creative synthesis, created and recreated through interactions even as previous conflicts are reconciled through integration.
Diverse views are integrated. Ideas are not divergent. They live between the perspectives, not outside of them. They are Inside The Box, not Outside The Box. Ideas are joined or synthesised.
Is not the integration of architecture and structure and building the perfect place for creative synthesis? We should engage with this conflict. We should use this conflict as a tool for creative solutions.
Conflict is therefore perpetual in creative synthesis, created and recreated through interactions even as previous conflicts are reconciled through integration.
Does this not perfectly describe the design process with the combined efforts of the architect, Structural engineer and builder; each with their different perspectives?
Dialectics and Extraordinary Group Creativity
The dialectical model is particularly useful for explaining the production of breakthrough ideas in groups for two reasons. First, dialectic analysis is fundamentally a way to understand collective processes (Benson, 1977) because it explains how multiple divergent entities change and develop over time (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Specifically, it is the fact that actors engage with one another that changes their understanding and allows new ideas to develop (Bartunek, 1984; Benson, 1977).
This relates to my idea that building layers to the narrative is important. I initial felt it was important solely for the purpose of understanding the project. But these conversations also allow for engagement of the actors. And it is this engagement that allows understanding of each other’s perspectives. And through this understanding encourages new ideas.
What is not mentioned here at all is the ability of the parties to listen. (I don’t know enough about listening
What is also not mentioned is the "yes" mentality at PIXAR. There are no bad ideas. Every idea has merit. Without this approach, creativity would be stifled if some parties just say "no" to everything.
Second, the dialectical model is better suited to explaining the consistent production of breakthrough ideas because it underlies relatively more radical novelty (Bartunek, 1984; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Synthesis and exemplars that flow from it are qualitatively different from what came before (Ford & Ford, 1994; Poole & Van de Ven, 1989). This is because integrating opposing dialectic forces provides the opportunity to change multiple features at once, which is associated with more profound change than altering a single dimension (Sheldon, 1980). For example, innovation in comic books can involve telling a novel story, offering a unique artistic interpretation of a story, or developing an unusual page structure (Taylor & Greve, 2006). Each is a relatively incremental novelty. In contrast, a comic book creator may combine a page structure associated with one genre with a story structure associated with another, opening up a new genre. This is a more dramatic change. It contains both of the genres that went before it, but it is more than a recombination of previous elements; it is fundamentally new (Ford & Ford, 1994). Because conflicting ways of understanding a situation have different values and priorities, change in multiple aspects (Farjoun, 2002)—and therefore breakthrough creativity— is more likely to result each time the process occurs.
It seems to me that Harvey is talking about what I call “emergent” ideas, or emergent architecture. Where two or more changes trigger a much bigger change than the two things combine. Similar to the idea of consciousness. Cells put together to form an organism could not have predicted the emergence of consciousness.
Drawing on these insights, the overriding proposition of this article is that a dialectic process of integrating multiple understandings into a creative synthesis increases the chance of developing a breakthrough idea. The process is summarized in Figure 1. Repeatedly generating ideas through this process can lead to the consistent production of breakthrough ideas, as each idea forms the foundation for a new process of synthesis. This is illustrated in Figure 2. Groups who leverage the process rely on synthesis, not variety, to produce a breakthrough. This does not imply that the process will always result in extraordinary creativity (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995); not every Pixar movie will necessarily be a hit, and the creativity of those that are can vary. I return to how the cognitive, social, and environmental resources that support random variation also provide critical boundary conditions for the synthesis process after developing the model.
Is there a challenge here though. There are humans here. Some individuals want to be the creative force. They don’t necessarily want to share the creative process with others.
Also, they may not want conflict. They may simply want their consultants to be subservient.
Creative Synthesis Process and the Development of Exemplars
The core creative activity of a dialectic process is the synthesis of different ways of understanding or interpreting a problem or situation (Bartunek, 1984; Benson, 1977; Hegel, 1977; Smith & Lewis, 2011). The synthesis both enables the development of specific ideas that exemplify the synthesis (exemplars) and develops along with those exemplars. Synthesis and exemplars therefore coevolve.
I’ll return here to my idea of co-creation.
Creative synthesis. Creative synthesis recognizes and develops complex connections between previously unrelated concepts (Bartunek, Gordon, & Weathersby, 1983; Bledow, Frese, Anderson, Erez, & Farr, 2009; Koestler, 1964). For example, connections include combinations of story, page structure, and art in comic books (Taylor & Greve, 2006); the fusion of artistic novelty with marketable sound in a song (LongLingo & O’Mahony, 2010; Peterson & Berger, 1971); the mixture of previously unrelated technological components in a new product (Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Hargadon, 2002); or the integration of art and technology in a Pixar movie. The connections constitute new patterns that capture new understandings (Lourenco & Glidewell, 1975; Poole & Van de Ven, 1989).
The synthesis is not a specific idea; it is a new way of understanding what an idea is. For example, Brown (1978) illustrated that the shift in IBM’s understanding of its business from “machines” to “information” altered the firm’s perception of what constituted a good idea for a new product. Similarly, Hargadon and Bechky described moments of collective creativity as involving “not only the original question, but also [considering] whether there is a better question to be asked” (2006: 492). The “better question” may open up new possibilities that were unlikely to be considered within the previous interpretation.
A more beautiful question - Berger.
The synthesis can be described as creative because the new pattern contained in it is a novel construction distinct from both the dominant understanding (i.e., the thesis) and an alternative perspective (i.e., the antithesis; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). For example, the team at world-renowned restaurant elBulli developed a unique culinary style of applying scientific techniques to high-quality ingredients to stimulate and surprise diners’ senses (Svejenova, Mazza, & Plannellas, 2007). The team’s approach differed from classical and nouvelle cuisine in relying heavily on science, but it also departed from pure science; it was a novel fusion of old approaches (e.g., classic) and new (e.g., scientific).
The value of creative synthesis in groups mirrors the way that individual creativity benefits from understanding a problem from different perspectives (Koestler, 1964; Miron-Spektor, Gino, & Argote, 2011), reorganizing knowledge (Baughman & Mumford, 1995; Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992; Scott, Lonergan, & Mumford, 2005), and identifying or constructing a novel problem (Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976; ReiterPalmon & Robinson, 2009; Zhang & Bartol, 2010). For example, identifying shared and unshared features of categories before generating ideas helps individuals structure their creative thinking and results in more original and higher quality ideas (Mobley, Doares, & Mumford, 1992; Mumford, Baughman, & Sager, 2003). Similarly, organizational innovation involves the recombination and synthesis of knowledge from different domains (Hargadon, 2002).
Creative synthesis, however, offers a fundamentally different explanation for creativity at the group level. According to the random variation process, group creativity occurs because members hold different perspectives that stimulate one another’s thinking. The most radical ideas will therefore be those that depart the most from those of the group. According to the creative synthesis process, group creativity occurs because the space that exists between members’ different perspectives offers the opportunity for a new framework to develop that connects them. Although researchers have suggested that group members should build on one another’s ideas (Kohn, Paulus, & Choi, 2011; Osborn, 1953), the rationale for doing so has been to stimulate divergence by, for example, opening up new categories for idea generation. In the creative synthesis model it is the connection between members’ ideas that is creative. Group researchers have also identified the value of shared goals to group creativity (Gilson & Shalley, 2004; West, 2002). That research, however, focuses on the motivational benefits that occur when members believe they share goals, rather than the construction of those goals. Exploring creative synthesis as a collective creative process can therefore provide new insights into group creativity.
Exemplars. The synthesis both enables the development of specific exemplar ideas based on the synthesis and develops [evolves?] along with those exemplars. It provides a shared way of understanding past and future ideas and events (Ford & Ford, 1995). That understanding can act as a map with which group members can search for and evaluate new ideas (Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Kuhn, 1970). Within the map are rules or assumptions that underlie the original perspectives that make up the synthesis and their relation to one another (Koestler, 1964). The emerging map then guides the idea generation process (Runco, 1994; Sternberg, 1998), helping the group to identify the most promising directions for uncovering creative ideas. In addition, because selection criteria are inherent in the map, the group may view new ideas differently, and, therefore, novel ideas may become acceptable and valued. In this way the synthesis provides a foundation for novel ideas to develop (Koestler, 1964). Those novel ideas—like a specific film or recipe [architecture]—are exemplars of the synthesis.
Novel ideas are the exemplars.
From this perspective, idea generation is not random; it is shaped by the rules and assumptions that make up the map. The map is unique to the group, so it leads the group to search for ideas in places that others have yet to discover, which can result in more creative solutions (Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976; Zhang & Bartol, 2010). Developing the map also helps the group to eliminate less productive directions, improving solution quality and the efficiency of the search process (Baer, Dirks, & Nickerson, 2013; Fleming & Sorenson, 2004).
Our goal as structural engineers is to understand the ‘map’ (I prefer to call it the framework) that make up the rules and assumptions that shape the ideas.
Creative synthesis can benefit the development of exemplars even if it contains an inaccurate view of the problem because it facilitates communication between group members (Cronin & Weingart, 2007) by endowing collective knowledge with structure and meaning (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). In addition, because the synthesis integrates diverse perspectives, members can benefit from exposure to different views of the problem during the process of constructing the synthesis. The synthesis is therefore likely to be as accurate as ideas generated and retained when members produce ideas through random variation. Finally, the synthesis can provide a group with the motivation to continue searching by giving them a “glimpse of the possible” (Fleming & Sorenson, 2004: 912).
Because exemplars can embody the synthesis in different ways, each idea that a group produces has the potential to be a breakthrough. The synthesis limits the number of variables a group can consider when developing an exemplar, but it also frees the group to focus its creative efforts on those variables that remain (Finke et al., 1992; Goldenberg, Mazursky, & Solomon, 1999). For example, Pixar uses technological and artistic solutions to warm audiences to traditionally unlikable characters, like a discarded, cranky toy in Toy Story or an insect in A Bug’s Life. Each character is unlikable in a different way and is rendered sympathetically with a unique solution—witty dialogue from an award-winning and popular actor in Toy Story and beautifully detailed and evocative animation in A Bug’s Life. Technology and art work together to bring characters to life, but in different combinations. Similarly, each dish at elBulli can embody the synthesis in a different way— one dish may surprise diners by being hot when they expect it to be cold; another may surprise diners by being crunchy when they expect it to be soft (Svejenova et al., 2007).
Over time, it may become increasingly difficult to develop breakthrough exemplars of a particular synthesis. For example, after several films a Pixar team may exhaust the number of ways to make a character likable and rely on a previous approach, producing an incrementally creative but not breakthrough movie. However, the synthesis is not fixed; it evolves as exemplars emerge that reveal and shape new understandings. When a new idea does not fit the synthesis, it provides an anomaly that actors try to make sense of (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002; Weick et al., 2005). Through that process a new understanding develops. The synthesis is essential in enabling members to recognize inconsistent ideas, but the inconsistencies also cause the synthesis to change (Kuhn, 1970). When Pixar created Wall-E, for example, it challenged its own understanding of dialogue and acting.
Process Facilitators of Creative Synthesis
Three processes can facilitate the integration of group members’ diverse views: collective attention, enacting ideas, and building on similarities within different perspectives. Each process facilitator operates by enabling the group’s cognitive processing of ideas, their social interactions, and their affective environment.
Collective attention. Synthesis begins by identifying and questioning existing assumptions (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011; Sheldon, 1980). Doing so can create disillusionment with an existing idea from which a new understanding can emerge (Palmer, 1969). This process implies that group members initially devote their collective attention to the prevailing paradigm and consider emerging ideas in light of a shared understanding of that paradigm. Having a shared understanding of the dominant view of a problem or task does not imply that group members agree with that understanding. Even while sharing underlying values, group members can disagree about specific actions and ideas (Cronin & Weingart, 2007; Heracleous & Barrett, 2001). At Pixar, for example, team members shared an understanding of the traditional “rules” of animated films, but they also wanted to tell stories in new ways that challenged those rules, and they held a variety of perspectives on how to do so. By collectively attending to the dominant view and then to new ideas in light of that view, teams at Pixar could diverge together from dominant assumptions, values, and rules. This is also illustrated by Farrell’s (1982, 2001) study of Batignolle French impressionist artists in the mid nineteenth century, who negotiated a shared vision of art that both derived and departed from the artistic movement of the time. Their shared understanding of the dominant paradigm enabled the artists to jointly attend to one another’s paintings and appreciate how a particular piece challenged an existing tenet of “good” art.
Collective attention can help creative synthesis to develop through cognitive, social, and affective mechanisms. First, collective attention facilitates group members’ cognitive engagement with new ideas and information so that new knowledge can be created. At the most basic level, group members cannot make meaningful connections between ideas without attending to those ideas as they are discussed in the group (Vera & Crossan, 2005)—for example, a group member cannot answer a question he or she has not listened to. Moreover, people are more likely to attend to ideas that fit their interpretations of a situation (Bartunek, 1984), so collective attention to ideas in light of the group’s shared understanding of the dominant frame gives new ideas meaning (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999) and opens up new areas for inquiry (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011). Group members can therefore become more deeply engaged with ideas that receive the group’s collective attention.
Second, collective attention facilitates group interaction (Collins, 2005) by situating new ideas within that interaction. Because the meaning of any idea is situated in a particular context (Elsbach, Barr, & Hargadon, 2005), focusing collective attention on a new idea establishes the basis for communication. Discussing, explaining, and translating the idea help to build collective understanding (Dougherty, 1992; Nonaka, 1994; Palmer, 1969). Collective attention can therefore make it easier for group members to communicate with one another and remain open to others’ ideas (Cronin & Weingart, 2007; Gilson & Shalley, 2004), enabling members to use one another’s information for subsequent idea generation (Reiter-Palmon, Herman, & Yammarino, 2008).
Third, collective attention promotes a positive affective group state (Collins, 2005; Quinn & Dutton, 2005). It makes the target, like a new idea, more psychologically meaningful (Schteynberg, 2010) and immerses group members in the interaction (Collins, 2005). This leads to a positive collective affective state, which enables group members to think more broadly and flexibly so that novel connections and unique integrations are more likely to form (Bartunek et al., 1983; Fredrickson, 2001; George & Zhou, 2002; Isen, 1999).
Collective attention originating from a shared understanding of the domain implies a different process than random variation. Both processes require conflict. Without disagreement, focusing collective attention on an idea may push a group toward consensus and, in doing so, prevent effective decision making (Janis, 1972). However, in the creative synthesis process, dissent is applied to changing the dominant understanding of a task or situation and to elaborating a specific idea from a unique perspective, rather than to generating a variety of ideas. The ability to use diverse resources is therefore necessary in both models, but those resources are transformed into creative output in different parts of the process. Diversity in the creative synthesis model will be most helpful when different perspectives are applied to one focal idea rather than used to stimulate many.
Enacting ideas. Enacting ideas that emerge during group interaction by producing physical objects can further aid creative synthesis. Enacting ideas moves them toward implementation. It therefore goes beyond abstract cognitive activities like elaborating ideas or identifying the disadvantages of a solution, although it may also help to do those things. Pixar enacts ideas by animating storyboards for a film. Depending on their content, ideas can also be captured in drawings (Carlile, 2002), prototypes (Hargadon, 2002; Schrage, 2000), or performances (Bartunek, 1984; Sawyer, 2004). Even conversations about how to enact an idea reveal ways to realize the idea (Ford & Ford, 1995). Enacting ideas is typically viewed as implementation activity that occurs at a later stage of the innovation process (Hülsheger et al., 2009; West, 2002). However, enacting ideas earlier in the creative process can provide a focal point for collective attention and help to transform collective understanding (Carlile, 2002; Nicolini, Mengis, & Swan, 2012). For example, enacting new structures that linked members of a religious order for the first time revealed new ways of thinking to members of the order when they became exposed to others’ perspectives (Bartunek, 1984).
Enacting ideas can facilitate creative synthesis through cognitive, social, and affective mechanisms. First, enacting ideas builds collective knowledge by illustrating what is and is not collectively known about an idea. It reveals underlying assumptions (Bartunek, 1984; Heracleous & Barrett, 2001) by making knowledge collectively accessible (Nonaka, 1994). For example, producing a few minutes of film illustrates how members of a Pixar team visualize the story and illuminates aspects of the story that the team has not yet brought to life. Similarly, realizing design team members’ expectations for a new product in a prototype illustrates their different interpretations of the idea. Enacting ideas therefore uncovers unforeseen problems (Hargadon, 2002; Schrage, 2000). At the same time it provides the information necessary for a group to solve those problems by creating a bridge between perspectives and assumptions. For example, a conversation between two engineers about a prototype allows one to explain his or her view and the other to reflect back that explanation. That process creates new meaning (Palmer, 1969). By enacting their ideas, groups can therefore experiment with, explore, and build new knowledge that is unique to the group (Carlile, 2002; Hargadon, 2002; Lee, Edmondson, Thomke, & Worline, 2004; Nicolini et al., 2012). Physically engaging with ideas further aids that process by activating cognitions and repositories of knowledge that stimulate creative thinking (Leung et al., 2012).
Second, enacting ideas initiates group interaction. Enacting ideas moves toward implementation, but it is not implementation. This means that no choice has been made and an idea can continue to develop. For this reason, early prototyping aids the development of a new product even when the prototype is incorrect (Thomke, 1998). As a result of the resolution of conflicting views and the overlap in perspectives, new practices and structures develop that are inconsistent with old ways of doing things (Ford & Ford, 1994). For example, Majchrzak, More, and Faraj (2012) describe how enacting ideas in a tunnel analogy helped a team to generate ideas for an educational experience. The tunnel encompassed team members’ collectively held knowledge, but it was interpreted differently by each member, so variety was retained. By revealing inconsistency yet leaving space for both interpretation and the solution to the inconsistency, enacting ideas produces idea generation that can lead to synthesis. Enacting an idea is therefore a starting point for group interaction that invites reactions from others (Tsoukas, 2009) in a way that merely discussing abstract ideas may not.
Third, enacting ideas can contribute to a group’s positive affect. By helping group members understand others’ abstract concepts, enacting ideas should reduce the chance of misunderstandings that lead to interpersonal conflict. Moreover, when people perceive their thought processes as progressing in a conceptually coherent way, they tend to experience positive affect (Mason & Bar, 2012). Enacting an idea may enhance this perception because it moves an idea forward and helps other group members connect their perspective to the enacted idea. Positive affect can also be characterized by the feeling that one wants to and is able to act (Quinn & Dutton, 2005; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Because enacting ideas is action oriented, group members may experience more positive affect. Enacting an idea means that the group is making progress toward its goal, and that feeling of progress can induce positive affect (Amabile & Kramer, 2011; Carver, 2003).
Enacting ideas involves a different process for collective idea generation than the cognitive stimulation underlying random variation. Cognition and action are inextricably linked through the synthesis process, so cognitive and group processes cannot be isolated from the interactions in which they occur (Elsbach et al., 2005). The assertion that enacting ideas aids creative synthesis does not deny the importance of cognition—cognition guides a group’s action, and action reveals underlying cognitions (Brown, 1978; Majchrzak et al., 2012). Cognitive engagement increases in both models. In random variation engagement is with one’s own ideas, whereas in creative synthesis it is with others’ ideas. However, this view also breaks down the separation between idea generation and idea implementation. In the synthesis model implementation begins early and continues throughout idea generation. Enacting ideas is not, however, about selecting or finalizing group output; it is a means to continually develop and refine the group’s understanding of the problem.
Building on similarities. Synthesis occurs when people begin to see similarities in otherwise disparate perspectives (Koestler, 1964). Therefore, although differences are what provide the opportunity for creative synthesis to develop (Ford & Ford, 1994; Seo & Creed, 2002), the persistence of differences disrupts synthesis (Heracleous & Barrett, 2001; Murnighan & Conlon, 1991). At Pixar, for example, directors actively search for solutions to similar problems they have experienced in the past. Elsbach and Kramer (2003) found that creative collaborations between Hollywood writers and producers began when producers experienced attraction to some element of a writer’s idea. Common attraction to an idea can fuel the interactions through which the idea develops. Therefore, identifying and building on similarities facilitates creative synthesis.
Similarities enable creative synthesis through cognitive, social, and affective mechanisms. First, cognitively, similarities are the basis for new connections between interpretations. New ways of thinking develop when differences are used to test others’ assertions by trying to strengthen, rather than weaken, those assertions (Palmer, 1969). For example, looking for similarities between a novel idea and existing ideas tends to broaden the focal idea by identifying new contexts in which to apply it (Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000). Intense consideration of an idea from multiple perspectives therefore helps people to develop more complex and creative understandings (Bartunek et al., 1983; Grant & Berry, 2011). The production and use of analogies can be a critical part of this process. Analogies involve comparing otherwise disconnected and incompatible ideas or objects (Koestler, 1964) by drawing on existing knowledge to explain and predict solutions to new problems (Dunbar, 1997; Gentner, 1989). Analogies can therefore shape new ways of understanding problems (Hargadon, 2002). For example, designers of the Rebok pump running shoe developed their ideas through an analogy to IV bags in medical devices.
A second mechanism through which similarities facilitate synthesis is the easing and expansion of group interaction. Analogies may be particularly valuable for groups because they directly connect members’ otherwise diverse perspectives by helping one group member reframe his or her knowledge in terms of another’s experiences. This should enhance communication between the two. Reciprocally, having multiple examples from which to draw analogies enables people to abstract an understanding that can be transferred to a new problem (Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Thompson, Gentner, & Loewenstein, 2000). Identifying similarities between group members’ perspectives can therefore lead to a deep structural insight that helps them to create and communicate a new understanding of the problem.
A third mechanism through which the search for similarities may facilitate creative synthesis is the group’s emergent affective state. Group members’ attraction to ideas can motivate synthesis (Ichazo, 1976, in Ford & Ford, 1994) by directing their attention toward particular ideas (Quinn & Dutton, 2005). For example, in Elsbach and Kramer’s (2003) study, producers used positive feelings as cues about writers and their ideas. Positive affective can signal that an idea is on the right track (Elfenbein, 2007; George & Zhou, 2002). Synthesis can then be built around the ideas that commonly attract different group members, despite their divergent views (Ford & Ford, 1994). Because people tend to react negatively to novel ideas (Mueller, Melwani, & Goncalo, 2012), group members may be more likely to feel positive when they are able to identify similarities between new ideas and their own experiences.
Building on similarities is an alternative way to use diversity and task conflict than that suggested by the random variation process. Like random variation, it requires that differences exist; a unanimously positive reaction to an idea may not motivate a group to continue developing the idea or searching for new alternatives (Ford, 1996; George & Zhou, 2002). Building on similarities without conflict may therefore lead a group to converge on an idea too quickly (Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003). However, the creative synthesis process differs in that a group reconciles those differences rather than uses them to branch off in different directions.
Relationships Between Process Facilitators, Creative Synthesis, and Outcomes
The model depicted in Figure 1 does not fully capture the complexity of the creative synthesis process. Idea generation and evaluation are concurrent and continuous throughout the model, and the process facilitators are likely to influence one another. For example, similarities may be identified within enacted ideas, and enacted ideas may form a starting point for collective attention.
In addition, the synthesis and creative output become the foundation for a continuing dialectic. After producing creative output, a group will receive feedback from the environment—from managers and customers, for instance. Team members may each interpret that feedback differently. Those processes reveal new conflicts and fissures. The synthesis therefore contains the building blocks for new paradoxes that lead to the next change (Ford & Ford, 1994; Poole & Van de Ven, 1989). Conflicts and paradoxes are never entirely resolved according to this view; they become integrated into creative products but continually resurface as the product and group develop (Kolb & Putnam, 1992; Murnighan & Conlon, 1991). The idea that results from creative synthesis is therefore both the outcome of the creative process and its starting point. Continually revising the synthesis makes it possible for groups to repeatedly produce breakthrough ideas.
BOUNDARY CONDITIONS: THE ROLE OF GROUP RESOURCES IN THE DIALECTICAL MODEL
Creative synthesis is a process through which a group’s cognitive, social, and environmental resources are combined into creative output. Therefore, cognitive resources like creative thinking skills, social resources inherent in group composition and dynamics, and environmental resources that support autonomy and motivation form critical boundary conditions for the model. Without these even extraordinarily creative groups can experience failure—after eleven hit films, for example, Pixar’s Cars 2 received a relatively poor critical and commercial reception. The dialectical model can fail to produce extraordinary creativity in two ways. First, without enough underlying conflict or diversity, there is little opportunity for a novel synthesis to form. In that case one perspective may dominate another or ideas may represent incremental adjustments to the status quo (Drazin et al., 1999; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Second, over long stretches of time, the synthesis may become stable and the group may exhaust novel exemplars. Cognitive, social, and environmental resources can mitigate the risk of these problems. Cognitively, creative synthesis requires members’ full engagement with one another and the creative task. There are at least two ways that a group’s cognitive resources could form a boundary condition for the process. First, group members may lack creative thinking skills. Skills like cognitive flexibility are important for creativity (Amabile, 1988), and groups with highly creative members tend to have higher levels of creativity (Pirola-Merlo & Mann, 2004; Taggar, 2002). Second, even if group members possess creative thinking skills, those cognitive resources could be depleted or enriched by the task context. Creativity is more likely when tasks are challenging, interdependent, and autonomous, because those tasks motivate members’ cognitive engagement (West, 2002). Similarly, factors like extreme time pressure that produce the need for efficiency can prevent group members from engaging in creative thinking (Baer & Oldham, 2006). This boundary condition also highlights that the creative synthesis process theorizes a different way for creative groups to combine their cognitive resources. Whereas research based on random variation shows that group interaction distracts individual creative thinking (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987), the creative synthesis model emphasizes that members draw on cognitive resources through deeper engagement with one another’s ideas.
Socially, variety in group membership produces the task conflict and dissent that stimulate creative synthesis. Groups low in diversity may fail to search for novel alternatives (Ford, 1996). Even if a creative process is triggered, the process facilitators of synthesis may lead to quick consensus around incremental or lowquality ideas when there is little diversity in the group (Janis, 1972; Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003). Diversity in group membership, both in terms of surface-level demographic characteristics (Watson et al., 1993) and deep-level differences in underlying knowledge (Muira & Hida, 2004), can stimulate members’ creative thinking. Introducing a new small subgroup into the team may also prompt changes in the synthesis over time, particularly where new information and feedback are not available in the task environment. This boundary condition also highlights that groups use their resources in alternative ways in the creative synthesis process. In the random variation process, diversity stimulates divergent idea generation. In the creative synthesis process, in contrast, members draw on their social resources by integrating members’ diverse perspectives.
Environmentally, a supportive context in which members are relatively equal in power and status also forms a boundary condition for the creative synthesis process. The outcome of a dialectic process depends on the relative power of those involved because members with authority can enforce their ideas and prevent opposition to their views (Benson, 1977). A supportive environment free of evaluative pressure is one of the most important facilitators of individual and group creativity (Amabile, Goldenfarb, & Brackfield, 1990; Woodman et al., 1993) because it ensures that members will be willing to voice ideas without fear of being ridiculed or ostracized. A flat hierarchy is likely to provide a more supportive context. Environmental conditions that encourage and support creativity, like setting organizational goals for creativity (Gilson & Shalley, 2004; West, 2002), should also enhance members’ willingness to search for creative synthesis. However, the environment also plays a critical role in providing feedback that forms new conflicts from which the synthesis can progress. Previous research focused on how a supportive social environment motivated the creative process. In the creative synthesis model the context ensures that the group structure and power dynamics facilitate constructive conflict, but it also provides varied input into that process.
The list of resources facilitating the creative synthesis process presented here is far from exhaustive. Other resources that support the creative process as it has traditionally been assumed to progress (for reviews see George, 2007; Gilson & Shalley, 2004; Paulus & Nijstad, 2003; West, 2002) are also likely to provide important resources for creative synthesis, without which groups may deplete the exemplars of the synthesis and fail to adapt the synthesis sufficiently over time. The creative synthesis process also should not be considered infallible. Even when groups possess the necessary resources and follow the process, breakthroughs may be rare. The argument advanced here is that creative synthesis improves the chance that a given group idea will be a breakthrough relative to the random variation process. It therefore provides a foundation for generating the consistently breakthrough ideas characteristic of extraordinary group creativity by enabling the production of many breakthrough exemplars and revising the synthesis over time.
DISCUSSION
Scholars have recently suggested that creativity research is becoming routinized, resulting in incremental, but few breakthrough, insights (Anderson, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2004; George, 2007). The model I have presented in this article is one attempt to stimulate relatively more radical directions for research by considering how some groups, like those at Pixar, are able to exhibit not only moments of creative brilliance but extraordinary group creativity.
Explaining Extraordinary Group Creativity
The first contribution of this article is one possible explanation of how some groups consistently produce breakthrough ideas over time, adding to the growing interest in performance that consistently exceeds normal expectations (e.g., Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2003). A random variation process founded on an evolutionary model predicts the rare occurrence of breakthrough ideas. The dialectical model presented here, in contrast, builds on the insight that radical ideas may be developed through a different process than incremental ideas (Madjar et al., 2011) to elaborate one way to improve the chance that each of a group’s ideas is a breakthrough.
Two features of the model enable the repetition of breakthroughs. First, the synthesis embodies a unique understanding of the problem or task that acts like a theory for producing ideas. The synthesis can therefore generate multiple exemplars, each of which can be a breakthrough. One mechanism of extraordinary group creativity, thus, is the process of constructing a shared understanding of a problem or situation. Virtually no research to date has examined how some groups are able to come up with novel ways of understanding problems (Reiter-Palmon & Robinson, 2009) or how group members build on and integrate one another’s ideas (Kohn et al., 2011). Moreover, solutions to promote idea generation through random variation, such as increasing diversity or task conflict, may make it more difficult for group members to engage in these activities, which require some convergence. The second feature of the model that enables the repetition of breakthroughs is that the synthesis itself is continually revised, because conflict is never resolved and outcomes are temporary and transitional. A second mechanism for extraordinary group creativity, thus, is constraint. Previous research indicates that constraints can enhance creativity by, for example, providing a template for idea generation (Goldenberg et al., 1999). How this operates at the group level, however, is unclear.
Insights into the Group Creative Process
Although researchers are increasingly exploring the group processes involved in creativity, research has yet to reconsider the nature of the creative process itself. The second contribution of this article is therefore to offer one alternative conceptualization of the creative process in groups that challenges the three characteristic features of the random variation process.
First, whereas the random variation process assumes a natural sequence in which stages can be isolated, creative synthesis emphasizes the integration of stages. There is no logical ordering to the relationship between synthesis and the development of exemplars; exemplars can derive from the synthesis, but they can also trigger a sensemaking process through which the group arrives at synthesis. Similarly, idea generation and evaluation occur simultaneously throughout the process. For example, connecting ideas produces novelty but also involves evaluating the constituent ideas to identify relationships between them. The continual evolution of synthesis with exemplars also implies that both are moments in a group’s life, rather than an outcome of the creative process. In the dialectical model ideas move from enacted prototypes to exemplars of the synthesis to creative output, and may influence the synthesis at each point. Creative synthesis therefore anticipates the continual development and refinement of ideas that have been demonstrated to improve group creativity (Nijstad, Stroebe, & Lodewijkx, 1998), rather than assumes that arriving at a single creative output is the goal of a group’s endeavors. These insights imply that future research should consider the mechanisms through which parts of the creative process that have traditionally been viewed separately, like problem construction, idea generation, and idea evaluation, mutually influence one another over time.
Second, random variation focuses on the production of new ideas through divergence. In contrast, the dialectical model shifts the emphasis to processes involved in evaluating novel ideas, which have received much less research attention (Harvey & Kou, 2013; Rietzschel et al., 2006). Perspectives and understandings must be evaluated to be integrated into the synthesis, and this may occur in part by evaluating enacted ideas. Synthesis is therefore a mechanism through which elements of different perspectives and ideas are retained. The retention mechanism takes priority over idea generation in the synthesis process because it both influences idea selection and guides the idea generation process. The dialectical model therefore calls for more precise research on how groups evaluate novel ideas. The model implies that synthesis helps groups to evaluate their ideas; however, the way that exemplars are selected and developed into final creative output requires further investigation.
Finally, whereas the prevailing model assumes an adaptive, goal-directed process, creative synthesis can be achieved by altering contexts to generate variety. From this perspective, the contexts and processes that support creativity are less important than the process of continually adjusting group interactions and performances (Ford & Ford, 1994; Livingstone, Palich, & Carini, 2002). Even maladaptive processes and environments may provide a source of variation.
For example, presenting an idea to a hostile audience provides a group with an alternative perspective from which a new synthesis can develop. The dialectical model offers a more practice-based approach to group creativity that is grounded in the way a group’s actions and interactions generate diversity and divergence (Nicolini, Gherardi, & Yanow, 2003), rather than the mental knowledge structures of group members. This view highlights that a group is embedded in its environment, because the environment is a source of variation for refining the group’s synthesis.
Taken together, the three alternative features constitute a model that deviates from the inputprocess-output approach to understanding groups by recognizing that groups “continually cycle and recycle” (Ilgen, Hollenbeck, Johnson, & Jundt, 2005: 519) as they move through the creative process and that the nature of those interactions changes both the teams and their outputs. The dialectical model therefore introduces questions about the flow of creative interactions and how transition points alter that flow. For example, one question for further research is how having one breakthrough idea shapes a group’s subsequent creative process and outcomes, because an idea is the input for a continuing synthesis in the dialectical model. A second question is how interactions with the external environment at various points over time affect a team’s creative progress. Context provides more than support in the dialectical model because a team’s encounters with the environment are a source of variation enabling further synthesis.
Resources to Support the Creative Process
Researchers have established a set of resources facilitating group creativity: the skills of group members, the ideal group composition, and a group’s internal and external environment. They have paid relatively less attention to the way groups draw on those resources. Incorporating the creative process through which groups use their resources into theories of group creativity may help to resolve discrepant findings in the existing literature. For example, the process suggested here implies that when diverse groups combine their underlying perspectives into a shared view of a problem and then generate solutions, they have a higher chance of developing a breakthrough idea than when they use their diversity to stimulate idea generation directly. Examining this process may therefore help to untangle some of the equivocal results about the value of diversity found in previous research.
The dialectical model can also offer new directions for research into the resources themselves. For example, like previous research, the synthesis process emphasizes group members’ cognitive engagement with the creative task. However, it also highlights the need for research into the relatively unexamined question of what factors lead group members to engage with one another’s ideas. Without this engagement, synthesis is not possible. Yet research to date broadly suggests that group members are likely to react negatively to one another’s novel ideas (Mueller et al., 2012; Runco & Smith, 1992). Similarly, whereas the creative synthesis process supports the importance of diversity, it suggests more careful attention to two dimensions of the composition of the group. First, the dialectical model implies that groups should bring together two or more previously disconnected competencies or bodies of knowledge, such as art and technology at Pixar. The less closely related those specialties, the greater the opportunity to develop a novel synthesis. Second, the model suggests that groups are more likely to benefit from a small number of subgroups with different areas of expertise but similar status, rather than maximum variance in backgrounds and perspectives. In addition, the model indicates that diversity is best applied to developing a shared task or problem understanding, rather than to generating ideas. Finally, while the creative synthesis process also requires the task context to motivate creativity, it opens up the possibility that the environment can stimulate the process by providing negative feedback that challenges a group’s synthesis.
CONCLUSION
Groups require cognitive, social, and environmental resources to generate extraordinary breakthrough ideas. The key message of this article is that combining those resources through a process of creative synthesis can help groups to produce and reproduce breakthrough ideas over time to achieve extraordinary levels of creative success.
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[1] I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
