We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets
Experiential learning theory offers a fundamentally different view of the learning process from that of the behavioural theories of learning based on an empiric; epistemology or the more implicit theories of learning that underlie tradition; educational methods, methods that for the most part are based on a rational idealist epistemology. From this different perspective emerge some very different prescriptions for the conduct of education, the proper relationship among learning, work, and other life activities, and the creation of knowledge itself.
This perspective on learning is called "experiential" for two reasons. The first is to tie it clearly to its intellectual origins in the work of Dewey, Lewin, and Piaget. The second reason is to emphasize the central role that experience plays in the learning process. This differentiates experiential learning theory
from rationalist and other cognitive theories of learning that tend to give primary emphasis to acquisition, manipulation, and recall of abstract symbols, and from behavioural learning theories that deny any role for consciousness and subjects experience in the learning process It should be emphasized, however, that the aim of this work is not to pose experiential learning theory as a third alternative to behavioural and cognitive learning theories, but rather to suggest through experiential learning theory a holistic integrative perspective on learning that
combines experience, perception, cognition, and behaviour. This chapter will describe the learning models of Lewin, Dewey, and Piaget and identify the common characteristics they share—characteristics that serve to define the
nature of experiential learning.
THREE MODELS OF THE EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING PROCESS
The Lewinian Model of Action Research and Laboratory Training
In the techniques of action research and the laboratory method, learning, change, and growth are seen to be facilitated best by an integrated process that begins with here and now experience followed by collection of data and observations about that experience. The data are then analyzed and the conclusions of this analysis are fed back to the actors in the experience for their use in the modification of their behavior and choice of new experiences.
Learning is thus conceived as a four-stage cycle, as shown in Figure 2.1. Immediate concrete experience is the basis for observation and reflection. These observations are assimilated into a “theory" from which new implications for action can be deduced. These implications or hypotheses then serve as guides in acting to create new experiences.
Two aspects of this learning model are particularly noteworthy. First is its emphasis on here and now concrete experience to validate and test abstract concepts. Immediate personal experience is the focal point for learning, giving life, texture, and subjective personal meaning to abstract concepts and at the same time providing a concrete, publicly shared reference point for testing the implications and validity of ideas created during the learning process. When
human beings share an experience, they can share it fully, concretely, and abstractly.
Experience as testing
Second, action research and laboratory training are based on feedback processes. Lewin borrowed the concept of feedback from electrical engineering to describe a social learning and problem solving process that generates valid information to assess deviations from desired goals. This information feedback provides the basis for a continuous process of goal-directed action and evaluation of the consequences of that action. Lewin and his followers believed
that much individual and organisational ineffectiveness could be traced ultimately to a lack of adequate feedback processes. This ineffectiveness results from an imbalance between observation and action—either from a tendency for individuals and organizations to emphasise decision and action at the expense
of information gathering, or from a tendency to become bogged down by data collection and analysis. The aim of the laboratory method and action research is to integrate these two perspectives into an effective, goal-directed learning process.
Feedback. Not looking or overwhelmed.
Dewey's Model of Learning
John Dewey’s model of the learning process is remarkably similar to the lewinian model, although he makes more explicit the developmental nature of learning implied in Lewin’s conception of it as a feedback process by describing how learning transforms the impulses, feelings, and desires of concrete
experience into higher-order purposeful action.
The formation of purposes is, then, a rather complex intellectual operation, involves: (1) observation of surrounding conditions; (2) knowledge of what has happened in similar situations in the past, a knowledge obtained partly by recollection and partly from the information,
odixce, and warning of those who have had a wider experience; and (3) judgment, which puts together what is
observed and what is recalled to see what they signify. A purpose differs from an
original impulse and desire through its translation into a plan and method of
action based upon foresight of the consequences of action under given observed
conditions in a certain way. The crucial educational problem is that of procuring the postponement of immediate action upon desire until observation and judgment have intervened. What! Delay? Until judgement?
Mere foresight, even if if takes the form of accurate prediction, is not, of course, enough. The intellectual anticipation, the idea of consequences, must blend with desire and impulse to acquire moving force. It then gives direction to what otherwise is blind, while desire gives ideas impetus and momentum. [Dewey, 1938, p. 69]
Desire (emotion) makes people take action. Rational guides. Plato?
Dewey’s model of experiential learning is graphically portrayed in Figure 2.2. We note in this description of learning a similarity with Lewin, in the emphasis on learning as a dialectic process integrating experience and concepts, observations, and action. The impulse of experience gives ideas their moving force, and ideas give direction to impulse. Postponement of immediate action is
essential for observation and judgment to intervene, and action is essential for
achievement of purpose. It is through the integration of these opposing but symbolically related processes that sophisticated, mature purpose develops from blind impulse.
Piaget's Model of Learning and Cognitive Development
For Piaget, the dimensions of experience and concept, reflection, and action form the basic continua for the development of adult thought. Development from infancy to adulthood moves from a concrete phenomenal view of the world to an abstract constructionist view, from an active egocentric view to a reflective internalized mode of knowing. Piaget also maintained that these have been the major directions of development in scientific knowledge (Piaget, 1970). The learning process whereby this development takes place is a cycle of interaction between the individual and the environment that is similar to the learning models of Dewey and Lewin. In Piaget's terms, the key to learning lies in
the mutual interaction of the process of accommodation of concepts or schemas to experience in the world and the process of assimilation of events and experiences from the world into existing concepts and schemas. Learning or, in Piaget's term, intelligent adaptation results from a balanced tension
between these two processes. When accommodation processes dominate
assimilation, we have imitation-the molding of oneself to environmental contours or constraints. When assimilation predominates over accommodation, we have play-the imposition of one’s concept and images without regard to environmental realities. The process of cognitive growth from concrete to abstract and from active to reflective is based on this continual transaction between assimilation and accommodation, occurring in successive stages, each of which incorporates what has gone before into a new, higher level
of cognitive functioning.
Piaget’s work has identified four major stages of cognitive growth that emerge from birth to about the age of 14-16. In the first stage (0-2 years), the child is predominantly concrete and active in his learning style. This stage is
called the sensory-motor stage. Learning is predominantly inactive through feeling, touching, and handling. Representation is based on action-for example, "a hole is to d:g." Perhaps the greatest accomplishment of this period is the development of goal oriented behavior: “The sensory-motor period shows a remarkable evolution from non intentional habits to experimental and exploratory activity which is obviously intentional or goal oriented" (Flavell, 1963, p. 107). Yet the child has few schemes or theories into which he can
assimilate events, and as a result, his primary stance toward the world is accommodative. Environment plays a major role in shaping his ideas and intentions. Learning occurs primarily through the association between stimulus
and response.
In the second stage (2-6 years), the child retains his concrete orientation but begins to develop a reflective orientation as he begins to internalize actions, converting them to images. This is called the representational stage. Learning is now predominantly ikonic in nature, through the manipulation of observations and images. The child is now freed somewhat from his immersion in immediate experience and, as a result, is free to play with and manipulate his images of the
world. At this stage, the child’s primarystar.ee toward the world is divergent. He is captivated with his ability to collect images and to view the world from different perspectives. Consider Bruner’s description of the child at this stage: What appears next in development is a great achievement. Images develop
an autonomous status, they become great summarizers of action. By age three
the child has become a paragon of sensory distractibility. He is victim of the laws
of vividness, and his action pattern is a series of encounters with this bright thing
which is then replaced by that chromatically splendid one, which in turn gives way
to the next noisy one. And so it goes. Visual memory at this stage seems to be
highly concrete and specific. What is intriguing about this period is that the child is
a creature of the moment; the image of the moment is sufficient and it is controlled
by a single feature of the situation (Bruner, 1966b, p. 13)
In the third stage (7-11 years), the intensive development of abstract symbolic powers begins. The first symbolic developmental stage Piaget calls the stage of concrete operations. Learning in this stage is governed by the logic of classes and relations. The child in this stage further increases his independence from his immediate experiential world through the development of inductive
powers:
The structures of concrete operations are to use a homely analogy, rather like parking lots whose individual parking spaces are now occupied and now empty; the spaces themselves endure, however, and leave their owner to look beyond the cars actually present toward potential, future occupants of the vacant and to-be-vacant spaces. [Flavell, 1963, p. 203)
Thus, in contrast to the child in the sensory motor stage whose learning style
was dominated by accommodative processes, the child at the stage of concrete
operations is more assimilative in his learning style. He relies on concepts and
theories to select and give shape to his experiences.
Piaget's final stage of cognitive development comes with the onset of
adolescence (12-15 years). In this stage, the adolescent moves from symbolic
processes based on concrete operations to the symbolic processes of
representational logic, the stage of formal operations. He now returns to a more
active orientation, but it is an active orientation that is now modified by the
development of the reflective and abstract power that preceded it. The symbolic powers he now possesses enable him to engage in hypothetico-
deductive reasoning. He develops the possible implications of his theories and
proceeds to experimentally test which of these arc true. Thus his basic learning
style is convergent, in contrast to the divergent orientation of the child in the
representational stage:
We see. then, that formal thought is for Piaget not so much this or that
specific behavior os if is a generalized orientation, sometimes explicit and
sometimes implicit, towards problem solving; an orientation towards organizing
data (combinatorial analysis), towards isolation and control of variables, towards
the hypothetical, and towards logical,us t if tea tbn and proof. [Flavell, 1963, p. 211]
This brief outline of Piaget’s cognitive development theory identifies those basic
developmental processes that shape the basic learning process of adults (see
Figure 2.3).
CHARACTERISTICS OF EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING
There is a great deal of similarity among the models of the learning process
discussed above.1 Taken together, they form a unique perspective on learning and development, a perspective that can be characterized by the following
propositions, which are shared by the three major traditions of experiential
learning.
Learning Is Best Conceived as a Process, Not in Terms of Outcomes
The emphasis on the process of learning as opposed to the behavioral
outcomes distinguishes experiential learning from the idealist approaches of
traditional education and from the behavioral theories of learning created by
Watson, Hull, Skinner, and others. The theory of experiential learning rests on
a different philosophical and epistemological base from behaviorist theories of
learning and idealist educational approaches. Modern versions of these latter
approaches are based on the empiricist philosophies of Locke and others. This
epistemology is based on the idea that there are elements of consciousness-
menial atoms, or, in Locke’s term “simple ideas" that always remain the same.
The various combinations and associations of these consistent elements form
our varying patterns of thought. It is the notion of constant, fixed elements of
thought that has had such a profound effect on prevailing approaches to
learning and education, resulting in a tendency to define learning in terms of its
outcomes, whether these be knowledge in an accumulated storehouse of facts
or habits representing behavioral responses to specific stimulus conditions. If
ideas are seen to be fixed and immutable, then it seems possible to measure how
much someone has learned by the amount of these fixed ideas the person has
accumulated.
Experiential learning theory, however, proceeds from a different set of
assumptions. Ideas are not fixed and immutable elements of thought but arc
formed and re formed through experience. In all three of the learning models
just reviewed, learning is described as a process whereby concepts are derived
from and continuously modified by experience. No two thoughts are ever the
same, since experience always intervenes. Piaget (1970), for example,
considers the creation of new knowledge to be the central problem of genetic
epistemology, since each act of understanding is the result of a process of
continuous construction and invention through the interaction processes of
assimilation and accommodation (compare Chapter 5, p. 99). Learning is an
emergent process whose outcomes represent only historical record, not
knowledge of the future.
When viewed from the perspective of experiential learning, the tendency to
define learning in terms of outcomes can become a definition of nor.learning, in
the process sense that the failure to modify ideas and habits as a result of
experience is maladaptive. The clearest example of this irony lies in the
behaviorist axiom that the strength of a habit can be measured by its resistance
to extinction. That is, the more I have "learned" a given habit, the longer I will
persist in behaving that way when it is no longer rewarded. Similarly, there are
those who feel that the orientations that conceive of learning in terms of outcomes as opposed to a process of adaptation have had a negative effect on the educational system. Jerome Bruner, in his influential book, Toward a
Theory of Instruction, makes the point that the purpose of education is to
stimulate inquiry and skill in the process of knowledge getting, not to memorize
a body of knowledge: “Knowing is a process, not a product” (1966, p. 72). Paulo
Freire calls the orientation that conceives of education as the transmission of
fixed content the “banking" concept of education:
Education thus becomes an act of depositing, in which the students are the
depositories and the teacher is the depositor. Instead of communicating, the
teacher issues communiques and mantes deposits which the students patiently
receive, memorize, and repeat This is the "banking' concept of education, in
which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving,
filing, and stonng the deposits. They do. it is true, have the opportunity to become
collectors or cota.'ogucrs of the things they store But m the last analysis, it is men
themselves who are filed away through the lack of creativity, transformation, and
knowledge in this (at best) misguided system For apart from inquiry, apart from
the praxis, men cannot be truly human. Knowledge emerges only through
invention and reinvention, through the restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful
inquiry men pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other. (Friere,
1974. p. 58)
Learning Is a Continuous Process Grounded in Experience
Knowledge is continuously derived from and tested out in the experiences of the learner. William James (1890), in his studies on the nature of human consciousness, marveled at the fact that consciousness is continuous. How is it, he asked, that I awake in the morning with the same consciousness, the same thoughts, feelings, memories, and sense of who I am that I went to sleep with the night before? Similarly for Dewey, continuity of experience was a powerful truth of human existence, central to the theory of learning:
. . , the principle of continuity of experience means that every experience both takes up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after… As on individual passes from one situation to another, his world, his environment, expands or contracts. He does not find himself Suing in another world but in a different part or aspect of one and the same world. What he has learned in the way of knowledge and skill in one
situation becomes an instrument of understanding and dealing effectively with the.
situations which follow. The process goes on as long as life and learning continue.
[Dewey, 1938, pp. 35. 44]
Although we are all aware of the sense of continuity in consciousness and experience to which James and Dewey refer, and take comfort from the predictability and security it provides, there is on occasion in the penumbra of that awareness an element of doubt and uncertainty. How do I reconcile my own sense of continuity and predictability with what at times appears to be a and development, a perspective that can be characterized by the following propositions, which are shared by the three major traditions of experiential learning.
Learning Is Best Conceived as a Process, Not in Terms of Outcomes
The emphasis on the process of learning as opposed to the behavioral
outcomes distinguishes experiential learning from the idealist approaches of
traditional education and from the behavioral theories of learning created by
Watson, Hull, Skinner, and others. The theory of experiential learning rests on
a different philosophical and epistemological base from behaviorist theories of
learning and idealist educational approaches. Modern versions of these latter
approaches are based on the empiricist philosophies of Locke and others. This
epistemology is based on the idea that there are elements of consciousness-
mental atoms, or, in Locke’s term “simple ideas’*-that always remain the same.
The various combinations and associations of these consistent elements form
our varying patterns of thought. It is the notion of constant, fixed elements of
thought that has had such a profound effect on prevailing approaches to
learning and education, resulting in a tendency to define learning in terms of its
outcomes, whether these be knowledge in an accumulated storehouse of facts
or habits representing behavioral responses to specific stimulus conditions. If
ideas are seen to be fixed and immutable, then it seems possible to measure how
much someone has learned by the amount of these fixed ideas the person has
accumulated.
Experiential learning theory, however, proceeds from a different set of
assumptions. Ideas are not fixed and immutable elements of thought but are
formed and re formed through experience. In all three of the learning models
just reviewed, learning is described as a process whereby concepts are derived
from and continuously modified by experience. No two thoughts are ever the
same, since experience always intervenes. Piaget (1970), for example,
considers the creation of new knowledge to be the central problem of genetic
epistemology, since each act of understanding is the result of a process of
continuous construction and invention through the interaction processes of
assimilation and accommodation (compare Chapter 5, p. 99). Learning is an
emergent process whose outcomes represent only historical record, not
knowledge of the future.
When viewed from the perspective of experiential learning, the tendency to
define learning in terms of outcomes can become a definition of nonleaming, in
the process sense that the failure to modify ideas and habits as a result of
experience is maladaptive. The clearest example of this irony lies in the
behaviorist axiom that the strength of a habit can be measured by its resistance
to extinction. That is, the more 1 have “learned" a given habit, the longer 1 will
persist in behaving that way when it is no longer rewarded. Similarly, there are
those who feel that the orientations that conceive of learning in terms of chaotic and unpredictable world around me? I move through my daily round ot
tasks and meetings with a fair sense of what the issues are, of what others are
saying ar.d thinking, and with ideas about what actions to take. Yet I am
occasionally upended by unforeseen circumstances, miscommunications, and
dreadful miscalculations. It is in this interplay between expectation and
experience that learning occurs. In Hegel’s phrase, "Any experience that does
not violate expectation is not worthy of the name experience." And yet
somehow, the rents that these violations cause in the fabric of my experience
are magically repaired, and I face the next day a bit changed but still the same
person.
That this is a learning process is perhaps better illustrated by the
nonlearning postures that can result from the interplay between expectation
and experience. To focus so sharply on continuity and certainty that one is
blinded to the shadowy penumbra of doubt and uncertainty is to risk dogmatism
and rigidity, the inability to learn from new experiences. Or conversely, to have
continuity continuously shaken by the vicissitudes of new experience is to be
left paralyzed by insecurity, incapable of effective action. From the perspective
of epistemological philosophy, Pepper (1942) shows that both these postures-
dogmatism and absolute skepticism-are inadequate foundations for the
creation of valid knowledge systems. He proposes instead that on attitude of
provisionalism. or what he calls partial skepticism, be the guide for inquiry and
learning (compare Chapter 5, p. 107).
The fact that learning is a continuous process grounded in experience has
important educational implications. Put simply, it implies that all learning is
relearning, How easy and tempting it is in designing a course to think of the
learner's mind as being as blank as the paper on which we scratch our outline.
Yet this is not the case. Everyone enters every learning situation with more or
less articulate ideas about the topic at hand. We are all psychologists,
historians, and atomic physicists. It is just that some of our theories are more
crude and incorrect than others. But to focus solely on the refinement and
validity of these theories misses the point. The important point is that the people
we teach have held these beliefs whatever their quality and that until now they
nave used them whenever the situation called for them to be atomic physicists,
historians, or whatever.
Thus, one's job as an educator is not only to implant new ideas but also to
dispose of or modify old ones. In many cases, resistance to new ideas stems
from their conflict with old beliefs that are inconsistent with them. If the
education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories,
examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas
into the person’s belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated. Piaget
(see Elkind, 1970, Chapter 3) has identified two mechanisms by which new ideas
are adopted by an individual—integration and substitution. Ideas that evolve
through integration tend to become highly stable parts of the person's
conception of the world. On the other hand, when the content of a concept
changes by means of substitution, there is always the possibility of a reversion to the earlier level of conceptualization and understanding, or to a dual theory of
the world where espoused theories learned through substitution are incon-
gruent with theories in-use that are more integrated with the person’s total
conceptual and attitudinal view of the world. It is this latter outcome that
stimulated Argyris and Schon’s inquiry into the effectiveness of professional
education:
We thought the trouble people have in learning new theories may stem not
so much /rom the inherent difficulty of the new theories as from the existing
theories people have that already determine practices. We call their operational
theories of action (heories-in use to distinguish them from the espoused theories
that are used to describe and justify behavior. IVe wondered whether the difficulty
in learning new theories of action is related to a disposition to protect the old
theory in use. (Argyris and Schon. 1974, p. viiij
The Process of Learning Requires the Resolution of Conflicts Between Dialectically Opposed Modes of Adaptation to the World
Each of the three models of experiential learning describes conflicts between
opposing ways of dealing with the world, suggesting that learning results from
resolution of these conflicts. The Lewinian model emphasizes two such
dialectics-the conflict between concrete experience and abstract concepts
and the conflict between observation and action.2 For Dewey, the major
dialectic is between the impulse that gives ideas their "moving force"and reason
that gives desire its direction. In Piaget’s framework, the twin processes of
accommodation of ideas to the external world and assimilation of experience
into existing conceptual structures are the moving forces of cognitive
development. In Paulo Freire’s work, the dialectic nature of learning and
adaptation is encompassed in his concept of praxis, which he defines as
"reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it’’ (1974, p. 36).
Central to the concept of praxis is the process of "naming the world,” which is
both active-in the sense that naming something transforms it-and
reflective-in that our choice of words gives meaning to the world around us.
This process of naming the world is accomplished through dialogue among
equals, a joint process of inquiry and learning that Freire sets against the
banking concept of education described earlier:
2 - The concept of dialectic relationshp is used advisedly in this work. The long history and
changing usages of this term, and parte alary the emotional and kteakogical connotations attending its usage in seme contexts, may cause some confusion tor the reader. However, no other term expresses as well the relationship between learning orientations described here-that of mutually opposed and ccr.Tcti-ig processes the results of each of which cannot be explained by the other, but whose mercer through confrontation cf the conflict between them results in a higher order process that transcends and encorrpasses them both. Ths definition comes closest to Hegel's use of the term but does not imply total acceptance of the Hegelian epistemology (compare Chapter 5, p. 117).
As we attempt to analyze dialogue as a human phenomenon, we discover
something which is fhe essence of dialogue itself: the word. But the word is more
than just an instrument which makes dialogue possible; accordingly, we must
seek its constitutive elements. Within the word u>e find two dimensions, reflection
and action, in such radical interaction that if one is sacrificed - even in part-the
other immediately suffers. There is no true word that is not at the same time a
praxis. Thus, to speak a true word :s to transform the world.
An unauthentic word, one which is unable to transform reality, results
when dichotomy is imposed upon its constitutive elements. When a word is
deprived of its dimension of action, reflection automatically suffers as well, and
the word is changed into idle chatter, into verbalism, mfo an alienated and
alienating "blah " It becomes an empty word, one which cannot denounce the
world, for denunciation is impossible without a commitment to transform, and
there is no transformation without action.
On the other hand, if action is emphasized exclusively, to the detriment of
reflection, the word is converted into aclivism. The latter -action for action's
sake negates the true praxis and makes dialogue impossible, hither dichotomy,
by creating unauthentic forms of existence, creates also unauthentic forms of
thought, which reinforce the original dichotomy.
Human existence cannot be silent, nor can if be nourished by false words,
but only by true words, with which men transform the world. To exist, humanly, is
to name the world, to change it Once named, the world in its turn reappears to
the namers as a problem and requires of them a new naming. Men are not built in
silence, but in word, in work, in action reflection
But while to say the true word—whkh is work, which is praxis- is fo
transform the world, saying that word is not the privilege of some few men, but the
right of every man. Consequently, no one can say a true word alone-nor can he
say it for another, in a prescriptive act which robs others of their words. (Freire,
1974, pp. 75. 76/
All the models above suggest the idea that learning is by its very nature a
tension- and conflict-filled process. N«w knowledge, skills, or attitudes are
achieved through confrontation among four modes of experiential learning,
Learners, if they are to be effective, need four different kinds of abilities
concrete experience abilities (CE), reflective observation abilities (RO),
abstract concepfua/izafion abilities (AC), and active experimentation (AE)
abilities. That is, they must be able to involve themselves fully, openly, and
without bias in new experiences (CE) They must be able to reflect on and
observe their experiences from many perspectives (RO). They must be able to
create concepts that integrate their observations into logically sound theories
(AC), and they must be able to use these theories to make decisions and solve
problems (AE). Yet this ideal is difficult to achieve. How can one act and reflect
at the same time? How can one be concrete and immediate and still be
theoretical? Learning requires abilities that are polar opposites, and the learner,
as a result, must continually choose which set of learning abilities he or she will
bring to bear in any specific learning situation. More specifically, there are two
primary dimensions to the learning process. The first dimension represents the concrete experiencing of events at one end and abstract conceptualization at
the other. The other dimension has active experimentation at one extreme and
reflective observation at the other. Thus, in the process of learning, one moves
in varying degrees from actor to observer, and from specific involvement to
general analytic detachment.
In addition, the uxiy in which the conflicts among the dialectic ally opposed
modes of adaptation get resolved determines the level of learning that results. If
conflicts are resolved by suppression of one mode anchor dominance by
another, learning tends to be specialized around the dominant mode and limited
in areas controlled by the dominated mode. For example, in Piaget’s model,
imitation is the result when accommodation processes dominate, and play
results when assimilation dominates. Or for Frcire, dominance of the active
mode results in "activism.” and dominance of the reflective mode results in
"verbalism."
However, when we consider the higher forms of adaptation-the process
of creativity and personal development -conflict among adaptive modes needs
to be confronted and integrated into a creative synthesis. Nearly every account
of the creative process, from Wallas’s (1926) four stage model of incorporation,
incubation, insight, and verification, has recognized the dialectic conflicts
involved in creativity. Bruner (1966a), in his essay on the conditions of
creativity, emphasizes the dialectic tension between abstract detachment and
concrete involvement. For him, the creative act is a product of detachment and
commitment, of passion and decorum, and of a freedom to be dominated by the
object of one’s inquiry. At the highest stages of development, the adaptive
commitment to learning and creativity produces a strong need for integration
of the four adaptive modes. Development in one mode precipitates development
in the others. Increases in symbolic complexity, for example, refine and sharpen
both perceptual and behavioral possibilities. Thus, complexity and the
integration of dialectic conflicts among the adaptive modes are the hallmarks of
true creativity and growth.
Learning Is an Holistic Process of Adaptation to the World
Experiential learning is not a molecular educational concept but rather is a
molar concept describing the central process of human adaptation to the social
and physical environment. It is a holistic concept much akin to the Jungian
theory of psychological types (Jung, 1923), in that it seeks to describe the
emergence of basic life orientations as a function of dialectic tensions between
basic modes of relating to the world. To learn is not the special province of a
single specialized realm of human functioning such as cognition or perception. It
involves the integrated functioning of the total organism-thinking, feeling,
perceiving, and behaving.
This concept of holistic adaptation is somewhat out of step with current
research trends in the behavioral sciences. Since the early years of this century
and the decline of what Gordon Allporl called the "simple and sovereign" theories of human behavior, the trend in the behavioral sciences has been away
from theories such as those of Freud and his followers that proposed to explain
the totality of human functioning by focusing on the interrelatedness among
human processes such as thought, emotion, perception, and so on. Research
has instead tended to specialize in more detailed exploration and description of
particular processes and subprocesses of human adaptation-perception,
person perception, attribution, achievement motivation, cognition, memory-
the list could go on and on. The fruit of this labor has been bountiful. Because of
this intensive specialized research, we now know a vast amount about human
behavior, so much that any attempt to integrate and do justice to all this diverse
knowledge seems impossible. Any holistic theory proposed today could not be
simple and would certainly not be sovereign. Yet if we are to understand human
behavior, particularly in any practical way, wo must in some way put together all
the pieces that have been so carefully analyzed. In addition to knowing how we
think and how we feel, we must also know when behavior is governed by
thought and when by feeling. In addition to addressing the nature of specialized
human functions, experiential learning theory is also concerned with how these
functions are integrated by the person into a holistic adaptive posture toward
the world.
Learning is the meyor process of human adaptation. This concept of
learning is considerably broader than that commonly associated with the school
classroom. It occurs in all human settings, from schools to the workplace, from
the research laboratory to the management board room, in personal
relationships and the aisles of the local grocery. It encompasses all life stages,
from childhood to adolescence, to middle and old age. Therefore it en
compasses other, more limited adaptive concepts such as creativity, problem
solving, decision making, and attitude change that focus heavily on one or
another of the basic aspects of adaptation. Thus, creativity research has tended
to focus on the divergent (concrete and reflective) factors in adaptation such as
tolerance for ambiguity, metaphorical thinking, and flexibility, whereas
research on decision making has emphasized more convergent (abstract and
active) adaptive factors such as the rational evaluation of solution alternatives.
The cyclic description of the experiential learning process is mirrored in
many of the specialized models of the adaptive process. The common theme in
all these models is that all forms of human adaptation approximate scientific
inquiry, a point of view articulated most thoroughly by the late George Kelly
(1955), Dewey, Lewin, and Piaget in one way or another seem to take the
scientific method as their model for the learning process; or to put it another
way, they see in the scientific method the highest philosophical and
technological refinement of the basic processes of human adaptation. The
scientific method, thus, provides a means for describing the holistic integration
of all human functions.
Figure 2.4 shows the experiential learning cycle in the center circle ar.da
model of the scientific inquiry process in the outer circle (Kolb, 1978), with
models of the problem-solving process (Pounds, 1965), the decision-makinq process (Simon, 1947), and the creative process (Wallas, 1926) in between.
Although the models all use different terms, there is a remarkable similarity in
concept among them. This similarity suggests that there may be great payoff in
the integration of findngs from these specialized areas into a single general
adaptive model such as that proposed by experiential learning theory. Bruner’s
work on a theory of instruction (1966b) shows one example of this potential
payoff. His integration of research on cognitive processes, problem solving, and
learning theory provided a rich new perspective for the conduct of education.
When learning is conceived as a holistic adaptive process, it provides
conceptual bridges across life situations such as school and work, portraying
learning as a continuous, lifelong process. Similarly, this perspective highlights
the similarities among adaptive/leaming activities that are commonly called by specialized names-learning, creativity, problem solving, decision making, and
scientific research. Finally, learning conceived holistically includes adaptive
activities that vary in their extension through time and space. Typically, an
mmediate reaction to a limited situation or problem is not thought of as learning
out as performance. Similarly at the other extreme, we do not commonly think
nf long term adaptations to one’s total life situation as learning but as
development. Yet performance, learning, and development, when viewed from
the perspectives of experiential learning theory, form a continuum of adaptive
postures to the environment, varying only in their degree of extension in time
and space. Performance is limited to short term adaptations to immediate
circumstance, learning encompasses somewhat longer-term mastery of generic
classes of situations, and development encompasses lifelong adaptations to
one’s total life situation (compare Chapter 6).
Learning Involves Transactions Between the Person and the Environment
So stated, this proposition must seem obvious. Yet strangely enough, its
implications seem to have been widely ignored in research on learning and
practice in education, replaced instead by a person centered psychological view
of learning. The casual observer of the traditional educational process would
undoubtedly conclude that learning was primarily a personal, internal process
requiring only the limited environment of books, teacher, and classroom.
Indeed, the wider "real-world" environment at times seems to be actively
rejected by educational systems at all levels.
There is an analogous situation in psychological research on learning and
development. In theory, stimulus-response theories of learning describe
relationships between environmental stimuli and responses of the organism.
But in practice, most of this research involves treating the environmental stimuli
as independent variables manipulated artificially by the experimenter to
determine their effect on dependent response characteristics. This approach
has had two outcomes. The first is a tendency to perceive the person-
environment relationship as one way, placing great emphasis on how
environment shapes behavior with little regard for how behavior shapes the
environment. Second, the models of learning are essentially decontextualized
and lacking in what Egon Brunswick (1943) called ecological validity. In the
emphasis on scientific control of environmental conditions, laboratory
situations were created that bore little resemblance to the environment of real
life, resulting in empirically validated models of learning that accurately
described behavior in these artificial settings but could not easily be generalized
to subjects in their natural environment. It is to me not surprising that the
foremost proponent of this theory of learning would be fascinated by the
creation of Utopian societies such as Walden II (Skinner. 1948); for the only way
to apply the results of these studies is to make the world a laboratory, subject to
"experimenter” control (compare Elms, 1981).
Similar criticisms have been made of developmental psychology. Piaget’s
work, for example, has been criticized for its failure to take account of
environmental and cultural circumstances (Cole, 1971). Speaking of develop
mental psychology in general, Bronfenbrenner states, “Much of developmental
psychology as it now exists is the science of the strange behavior of children in
strange situations with strange adults for the briefest possible periods of time”
(1977, p. 19).
In experiential learning theory, the transactional relationship between the
person and the environment is symbolized in the dual meanings of the term
experience-one subjective and personal, referring to the person's internal
state, as in “the experience of joy and happiness," and the other objective and
environmental, as in, “He has 20 years of experience on this job." These two
forms of experience interpenetrate and interrelate in very complex ways, as, for
example, in the old saw, “He doesn't have 20 years of experience, but one year
repeated 20 times." Dewey describes the matter this way:
Experience does not go on simply inside a person. It does go on there, for it
influences the formation of attitudes of desire and purpose. But this is not the whole
of the story. Every genuine expcnence has an active side u/hich changes in some
degree the objective conditions under which experiences are had. The difference
between civilization and savagery, to take an example on a largo scale, is found in
the degree in which previous experiences have changed the objective conditions
under which subsequent experiences take place. The existence of roads, of
means of rapid movement and transportation, tools, implements, furniture,
electric light and power, are illustrations. Destroy the external conditions of
present civilized experience, and for a time our experience would relapse into that
of barbaric peoples. . . .
The word “interaction" assigns equal rights to both factors in experience-
objective and interna! conditions. Any normal experience is an interplay of these
two sets of conditions. Taken together . . . they form what we call a situation.
The statement that individuals live in a world means, in the concrete, that
they live in a series of situations. And when it is said that they live in these
situations, the meaning of the word "in “is different from its meaning when it is said
that pennies are "in" a pocket or paint is “in" a can. It means, once more, that
interaction is going on between an individual and objects and other persons. The
conceptions of situation and of interaction are inseparable from each other An
experience is alweys what it is because of a transaction taking place between an
individual and what, at the time, constitutes his environment, whether the latter
consists of persons with whom he is talking about some topic or event, the subject
talked about being also a part of the situation; the book he is reeding (in which his
environing conditions at the time may be England cr ancient Greece or an
imaginary region); or the materials of an experiment he is performing. The
environment, in other words, is whatever conditions interact with persona! needs,
desires, purposes, end capacities to create the experience which is had. Even
when a person builds a castle in the air he is interacting with the objects which he
constructs infancy. [Dewey, 1938, p. 39, 42-431
Although Dewey refers to the relationship between the objective and
subjective conditions of experience as an "interaction," he is struggling in the
last portion of the quote above to convey the special, complex nature of the
relationship. The word transaction is more appropriate than interaction to
describe the relationship between the person and the environment in
experiential learning theory, because the connotation of interaction is somehow
too mechanical, involving unchanging separate entities that become inter
twined but retain their separate identities This is why Dewey attempts to give
special meaning to the word in. The concept of transaction implies a more fluid,
interpenetrating relationship between objective conditions and subjective
experience, such that once they become related, both are essentially changed.
Lewin recognized this complexity, even though he chose to sidestep it in
his famous theoretical formulation. B = f(P,E), indicating that behavior is a
function of the person and the environment without any specification as to the
specific mathematical nature of that function The position taken in this work is
similar to that of Bandura (1978)—namely, that personal characteristics,
environmental influences, and behavior all operate in reciprocal determination,
each factor influencing the others in an interlocking fashion. The concept of
reciprocally determined transactions between person and learning environ
ment is central to the laboratory training method of experiential learning.
Learning in T-groups is seen to result not simply from responding to a fixed
environment but from the active creation by the learners of situations that meet
their learning objectives:
The essence of this learning experience is a transactional process in which
the members negotiate as each attempts to influence or control the stream of
events and to satisfy his personal needs. Indkxduak learn to the extent that they
expose their needs, values, and Itehavior patterns so that perceptions and
reactions can be exchanged. Behavior thus becomes the currency for
transaction. The amount each invests helps to determine the return, fBradford,
1964. p 192}
Learning in this sense ts an active, self directed process that can be applied not
only in the group setting but in everyday life.
Learning Is the Process of Creating Knowledge
To understand learning, we must understand the nature and forms of human
knowledge and the processes whereby this knowledge :s created. It has already
been emphasized that this process of creation occurs at all levels of
sophistication, from the most advanced forms of scientific research to the
child’s discovery that a rubber ball bounces. Knowledge is the result of the
transaction between social knowledge and personal knowledge. The former, as
Dewey noted, is the civilized objective accumulation of previous human cultural
experience, whereas the latter is the accumulation of the individual person's subjective life experiences. Knowledge results from the transaction between
these objective and subjective experiences in a process called learning. Hence,
to understand knowledge, we must understand the psychology of the learning
process, and to understand learning, we must understand epistemology-the
origins, nature, methods, and limits of knowledge. Piaget makes the following
comments on these last points:
Psychofogy thus occupies a key position, and its implications become increasingly
clear. The very simple reason for this is that if the sciences of nature explain the
human species, humans in turn explain the sciences of nature, and it is up to
psychology to show us how. Psychology, in fact, represents the junction of two
opposite directions of scientific thought that are dialectically complementary. It
follows that the system of sciences cannot be arranged in a linear order, as many
people beginning with Auguste Comte have attempted to arrange them. The form
that characterizes the system of sciences is that of a circle, or more precisely that
of a spiral as it becomes ever larger. In fact, objects are known only through the
subject, while the subject can know himself or herself only by acting on objects
materially and mentai’y. Indeed, if objects are innumerable and science
indefinitely diverse, all knowledge of the subject brings us back to psychology, the
science of the subject and the subject's actions
. , . it is impossible to dissociate psychology from epistemology . . . howls
knowledge acquired, how doc* it increase, and how does it become organized or
reorganized? . . The answers u efind, and from which we can only choose by
more or less refining them, arc necessarily of the following three types: Either
kriotv/edge comes exclusively from the object, or it is constructed by the subject
alone, or it results from multiple interactions between the subject and the object-
but what interactions and in what form? Indeed, we see at once that these are
epistemological solutions stemming from empiricism, aphorism, or diverse
mieractionism fPiaget, 1978. p 6517
It is surprising that few learning an<i cognitive researchers other than
Piaget have recognized the intimate relationship between learning and
knowledge and hence recognized the need for epistemological as well as
psychological inquiry into these related processes. In my own research and
practice with experiential learning, I have been impressed with the very practical
ramifications of the epistemological perspective. In teaching, for example, I
have found it essential to take into account the nature of the subject matter in
deciding how to help students learn the material at hand. Trying to develop skills
in empathic listening is a different educational task, requiring a different
teaching approach from that of teaching fundamentals of statistics. Similarly, in
consulting work with organizations, I have often seen barriers to communica
tion and problem solving that at root are epistemologically based-that is,
based on conflicting assumptions about the nature of knowledge and truth.
The theory of experiential learning provides a perspective from which to
approach these practical problems, suggesting a typology of different
knowledge systems that results from the way the dialectic conflicts between
adaptive modes of concrete experience and abstract conceptualization and the modes of active experimentation and reflective observation are characterise
rally resolved in different fields of inquiry (compare Chapter 5). This approach
draws on the work of Stephen Pepper (1942, i%6), who proposes a system tor
describing the different viable forms of social knowledge. This system is based
on what Pepper calls world hypotheses. World hypotheses correspond to
metaphysical systems that define assumptions and rules for the development of
refined knowledge from common sense. Pepper maintains that all knowledge
systems are refinements of common sense based on different assumptions
about the nature of knowledge and truth. In this process of refinement he sees a
basic dilemma, Although common sense is always applicable as a means of
explaining an experience, it tends to be imprecise. Refined knowledge, on the
other hand, is precise but limited in its application or generalizability because it
is based on assumptions or world hypotheses. Thus, common sense requires
the criticism of refined knowledge, and refined knowledge r equires the security
of common sense, suggesting that all social knowledge requires an attitude of
partial skepticism in its interpretation.
SUMMARY: A DEFINITION OF LEARNING
Even though definitions have a way of making things seem more certain than
they are. it may be useful to summarize this chapter on the characteristics of the
experiential learning process by offering a working definition of learning.3
Learning is the process whereby knowledge is created through the
transformation of experience. This definition emphasizes several critical
aspects of the learning process as viewed from the experiential perspective.
First is the emphasis on the process of adaptation and learning as opposed to
content or outcomes. Second is that knowledge is a transformation process,
being continuously created and recreated, not an independent entity to be
acquired or transmitted. Third, learning transforms experience in both its
objective and subjective forms. Finally, to' understand learning, we must
understand the nature of knowledge, and vice versa,